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文章來源：

《外交政策》（Foreign Policy）雜志

中文翻譯：

Jennie Yu（Wechat Official Account: itsjennieyu）

導語

3月20日，《外交政策》(Foreign Policy)雜志組織了12位頂尖的國際事務專家討論新冠疫情對世界的影響，發表題為《新冠大流行之后，世界將走向何方？》一文。

https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/20/world-order-after-coroanvirus-pandemic/

12位國際事務專家涵蓋政治、軍事、經濟、國際組織、公共衛生等領域，“全明星陣容”令人矚目。以下為12位專家的觀點摘要。

1

A World Less Open, Prosperous, and Free

一個更不開放、不繁榮、不自由的世界

Stephen M. Walt，哈佛大學肯尼迪政府學院國際事務教授，國際關系的現實主義學派

https://www.flickr.com/photos/ceuhungary/34788129820

The pandemic will strengthen the state and reinforce nationalism. COVID-19 will also accelerate the shift in power and influence from West to East. South Korea and Singapore have responded best, and China has reacted well after its early mistakes. The response in Europe and America has been slow and haphazard by comparison, further tarnishing the aura of the Western “brand.”

大流行將加強國家力量和民族主義，也將加速權力和影響力從西方轉移到東方。韓國和新加坡的反應最好，而中國在經歷了早期的錯誤之后反應良好。相比之下，歐美的反應緩慢而隨意，進一步損害了西方“品牌”的光環。

What won’t change is the fundamentally conflictive nature of world politics. Previous plagues—including the influenza epidemic of 1918-1919—did not end great-power rivalry nor usher in a new era of global cooperation. Neither will COVID-19. We will see a further retreat from hyperglobalization, as citizens look to national governments to protect them and as states and firms seek to reduce future vulnerabilities.

不會改變的是世界政治的沖突本質。先前的瘟疫(包括1918-1919年的流感大流行)并未結束大國之間的競爭，也未迎來全球合作的新時代。這次也不會。隨著公民們尋求國家政府的保護，以及各州和企業尋求減少未來的脆弱性，我們將看到“超全球化”的進一步退縮。

2

The End of Globalization as We Know It

為我們所知的全球化的終結

Robin Niblett，英國國際關系專家

https://www.facebook.com/ChathamHouse/photos/robin-niblett-director-of-chatham-house-was-today-awarded-the-companion-of-the-o/10152599369087689/

The coronavirus pandemic could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back of economic globalization. China’s growing economic and military power had already provoked a bipartisan determination in the United States to decouple China from U.S.-sourced high technology and intellectual property and try to force allies to follow suit. Increasing public and political pressure to meet carbon emissions reduction targets had already called into question many companies’ reliance on long-distance supply chains. Now, COVID-19 is forcing governments, companies, and societies to strengthen their capacity to cope with extended periods of economic self-isolation.

COVID-19大流行對于經濟全球化而言可能是壓倒駱駝的最后一根稻草。中國日益增長的經濟和軍事實力已經使得美國兩黨形成一致判斷，即要使中國與美國的高科技和知識產權脫鉤，并試圖迫使其盟友效仿。此外，實現碳減排目標的公共和政治壓力日益增強。這迫使政府、公司和社會加強其應對長期的經濟自我孤立的能力。

It seems highly unlikely in this context that the world will return to the idea of mutually beneficial globalization that defined the early 21st century. And without the incentive to protect the shared gains from global economic integration, the architecture of global economic governance established in the 20th century will quickly atrophy. It will then take enormous self-discipline for political leaders to sustain international cooperation and not retreat into overt geopolitical competition.

在這種情況下，世界似乎極不可能回到定義了21世紀初的互利全球化的概念狀態。如果沒有動力保護共享利益不受全球經濟一體化的影響，那么20世紀建立的全球經濟治理架構將迅速萎縮。如此一來，政治領導人將需要極大的自律才能維持國際合作，而非退縮到公開的地緣政治競爭中。

Proving to their citizens that they can manage the COVID-19 crisis will buy leaders some political capital. But those who fail will find it hard to resist the temptation to blame others for their failure.

向公民證明他們可以應對疫情危機，將為領導人帶來一些政治資本。但是那些失敗的人會發現很難抗拒將失敗歸咎于他人的誘惑。

3

A More China-Centric Globalization

一個更以中國為中心的全球化

Kishore Mahbubani，新加坡國立大學亞洲研究所研究員，前新加坡駐聯合國大使

https://www.flickr.com/photos/worldeconomicforum/6772169889;https://www.publicaffairsbooks.com/titles/kishore-mahbubani/has-china-won/9781541768123/

The COVID-19 pandemic will not fundamentally alter global economic directions. It will only accelerate a change that had already begun: a move away from U.S.-centric globalization to a more China-centric globalization.

COVID-19大流行不會從根本上改變全球經濟發展方向。它只會加速已經開始的變革，即從以美國為中心的全球化向更加以中國為中心的全球化轉變。

Why will this trend continue? The American population has lost faith in globalization and international trade. Free trade agreements are toxic, with or without U.S. President Donald Trump. By contrast, China has not lost faith. Why not? There are deeper historical reasons. Chinese leaders now know well that China’s century of humiliation from 1842 to 1949 was a result of its own complacency and a futile effort by its leaders to cut it off from the world. By contrast, the past few decades of economic resurgence were a result of global engagement.

為什么這種趨勢會繼續下去？因為美國人對全球化和國際貿易失去了信心。無論有沒有特朗普，自由貿易協定都是有毒的。相比之下，中國并沒有失去信心。為什么不？有更深的歷史原因。中國現在已經知道，從1842年到1949年，中國遭受屈辱的一個世紀是其自身的自滿情緒以及當時努力將自身與世隔絕的結果。相比之下，過去幾十年的經濟復蘇是全球參與的結果。

Consequently, as I document in my new book, Has China Won?, the United States has two choices. If its primary goal is to maintain global primacy, it will have to engage in a zero-sum geopolitical contest, politically and economically, with China. However, if the goal of the United States is to improve the well-being of the American people—whose social condition has deteriorated—it should cooperate with China. Wiser counsel would suggest that cooperation would be the better choice. However, given the toxic U.S. political environment toward China, wiser counsel may not prevail.

因此，正如新書《中國贏了嗎？》所述，美國有兩種選擇。如果其主要目標是維持全球主導地位，它將必須與中國在政治和經濟上進行零和的地緣政治競賽。但是，如果美國的目標是改善其社會狀況日益惡化的人民的福祉，那么它應該與中國合作。明智的政策顧問會建議，合作將是更好的選擇。但是，鑒于美國對華政治環境惡劣，這些明智的政策顧問們可能不會占上風。

4

Democracies Will Come out of Their Shell

民主國家將擺脫困境

G. John Ikenberry，國際關系和美國外交政策專家，普林斯頓大學政治與國際事務教授

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:G._John_Ikenberry_at_the_Miller_Center_Colloquium..jpg

In the short term, the crisis will give fuel to all the various camps in the Western grand strategy debate. Given the economic damage and social collapse that is unfolding, it is hard to see anything other than a reinforcement of the movement toward nationalism, great-power rivalry, strategic decoupling, and the like.

在短期內，這場危機將為西方大戰略辯論中的所有陣營提供動力。鑒于正在遭受的經濟破壞和社會崩潰，除了加強民族主義、大國競爭、戰略脫鉤等行動外，幾乎看不到其他任何東西。

But just like in the 1930s and ’40s, there might also be a slower-evolving countercurrent, a sort of hardheaded internationalism similar to the one that Franklin D. Roosevelt and a few other statesmen began to articulate before and during the war. The 1930s collapse of the world economy showed how connected modern societies were and how vulnerable they were to what FDR called contagion. The United States was less threatened by other great powers than by the deep forces—and Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde character—of modernity. What FDR and other internationalists conjured was a postwar order that would rebuild an open system with new forms of protection and capacities to manage interdependence. The United States couldn’t simply hide within its borders, but to operate in an open postwar order required the building of a global infrastructure of multilateral cooperation.

但是，就像1930年代和40年代一樣，逆潮流的發展可能也較慢，這是一種頑固的國際主義，類似于富蘭克林·羅斯福和其他一些政治家在戰前和戰時闡述的那種國際主義。1930年代世界經濟的崩潰表明現代社會之間是如何聯系的，以及它們在羅斯福所稱的傳染病面前是如此脆弱。美國受到其他大國的威脅要少于受到如“變身怪醫”般的現代性的強大力量威脅。羅斯福和其他國際主義者想到的是戰后世界秩序，它將重建一個具有新形式的保護和管理相互依存能力的開放體系。美國不能僅僅躲藏在其邊界內，而要按照戰后的開放秩序開展行動，這就需要建立全球性的多邊合作基礎設施機制。

So the United States and other Western democracies might travel through this same sequence of reactions driven by a cascading sense of vulnerability; the response might be more nationalist at first, but over the longer term, the democracies will come out of their shells to find a new type of pragmatic and protective internationalism.

因此，美國和其他西方國家可能會經歷同樣的一系列反應，這種反應是由噴薄而出的脆弱性所驅動的。其回應最初可能是民族主義，但從長遠來看，西方國家會擺脫困境，找到一種新型的實用主義和保護性國際主義。

5

Lower Profits, but More Stability

收益更低、但更穩定

Shannon K. O’Neil, 美國外交關系協會拉丁美洲研究高級研究員

https://www.as-coa.org/watchlisten/video-book-launch-two-nations-indivisible-mexico-united-states-and-road-ahead

COVID-19 is undermining the basic tenets of global manufacturing. Companies will now rethink and shrink the multistep, multicountry supply chains that dominate production today.

COVID-19正在破壞全球制造業的基本原則。一些公司將重新考慮并縮小如今主導生產的多步驟、多國家供應鏈。

Global supply chains were already coming under fire—economically, due to rising Chinese labor costs, U.S. President Donald Trump’s trade war, and advances in robotics, automation, and 3D printing, as well as politically, due to real and perceived job losses, especially in mature economies. COVID-19 has now broken many of these links: Factory closings in afflicted areas have left other manufacturers—as well as hospitals, pharmacies, supermarkets, and retail stores—bereft of inventories and products.

全球供應鏈已在經濟和政治上受到沖擊。在經濟上，這是由于中國勞動力成本上漲，特朗普的貿易戰，以及機器人技術、自動化和3D打印技術的進步。在政治上，這是由于實際和可感知的失業增長，特別是在成熟經濟體中。疫情已在不同方面打破了全球供應鏈的紐帶，例如受災地區的工廠關閉使其他制造商以及醫院、藥房、超級市場和零售商店的庫存和產品流失。

On the other side of the pandemic, more companies will demand to know more about where their supplies come from and will trade off efficiency for redundancy. Governments will intervene as well, forcing what they consider strategic industries to have domestic backup plans and reserves. Profitability will fall, but supply stability should rise.

在大流行的另一面，更多公司將要求更了解其供應來源，并以效率為代價予以折衷。各國政府也將進行干預，迫使那些被其視作“戰略性”的行業制定國內后備計劃和儲備。盈利能力將下降，但供應穩定性會提高。

6

This Pandemic Can Serve a Useful Purpose

這次大流行能夠發揮有益作用

Shivshankar Menon，美國布魯金斯學會印度中心研究員，曾任印度總理曼莫漢·辛格的國家安全顧問

https://theprint.in/walk-the-talk/need-to-take-an-extra-step-maintain-new-equilibrium-with-china-menon/83307/

It is early days yet, but three things seem apparent. First, the coronavirus pandemic will change our politics, both within states and between them. It is to the power of government that societies—even libertarians—have turned. Government’s relative success in overcoming the pandemic and its economic effects will exacerbate or diminish security issues and the recent polarization within societies. Either way, government is back.

疫情目前還處于初期，但有三件事已趨于明朗。首先，大流行將改變我們的國家內政治與國家間政治。政府在克服大流行及其經濟影響方面的相對成功將加劇或減少安全問題以及近期社會內部的兩極分化。無論是哪種方式，政府力量都重回人們視線。

Secondly, this is not yet the end of an interconnected world. The pandemic itself is proof of our interdependence. But in all polities, there is already a turning inward, a search for autonomy and control of one’s own fate. We are headed for a poorer, meaner, and smaller world.

其次，這不是互聯世界的終結。大流行本身就是我們相互依存的證明。但是在所有政治體中，已經有了內化，尋求自主權和對自身命運控制權的出現。我們將走向一個更貧窮，更卑鄙和更小的世界。

Finally, there are signs of hope and good sense. India took the initiative to convene a video conference of all South Asian leaders to craft a common regional response to the threat. If the pandemic shocks us into recognizing our real interest in cooperating multilaterally on the big global issues facing us, it will have served a useful purpose.

最后，也存在著希望和善意的態度。印度主動召開了一次所有南亞領導人參與的電視會議，以期就該威脅達成共同的區域應對措施。如果這種流行病使我們認識到我們真正感興趣的是在我們面臨的全球性大問題上進行多邊合作，那么它將起到有益的作用。

7

American Power Will Need a New Strategy

美國權力需要一種新戰略

Joseph S. Nye, Jr.，“軟實力”之父，曾任哈佛大學肯尼迪政府學院院長，卡特政府的副國務卿幫辦、克林頓政府的助理國防部長及國家情報委員會主席

http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/668619.html

In 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump announced a new national security strategy that focuses on great-power competition. COVID-19 shows this strategy to be inadequate. Even if the United States prevails as a great power, it cannot protect its security by acting alone.

2017年，美國總統唐納德·特朗普宣布了一項側重于大國競爭的新國家安全戰略。COVID-19的爆發則顯示出這一戰略的不充分性。即使美國以大國之姿主宰（世界），也不能通過單獨行動來保護自身安全。

On transnational threats like COVID-19 and climate change, it is not enough to think of American power over other nations. The key to success is also learning the importance of power with others. Every country puts its national interest first; the important question is how broadly or narrowly this interest is defined. COVID-19 shows we are failing to adjust our strategy to this new world.

對于像COVID-19和氣候變化這樣的跨國威脅，僅僅考慮美國相對于其他國家的力量是不夠的。成功的關鍵還在于與他者共同認識到權力的重要性。每個國家都將國家利益放在首位，但重要的問題是對這種利益的界定是廣義的還是狹義的。目前表明，美國未能制定與新世界相適應的國家戰略。

8

The History of COVID-19 Will Be Written by the Victors

歷史將由勝利者書寫

John Allen，國布魯金斯學會現任主席，曾任美國海軍陸戰隊四星將軍，北約國際安全援助部隊和駐阿富汗美軍的前司令官

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:120209-D-VO565-006_-_John_R._Allen.jpg

As it has always been, history will be written by the “victors” of the COVID-19 crisis. Every nation, and increasingly every individual, is experiencing the societal strain of this disease in new and powerful ways. Inevitably, those nations that persevere—both by virtue of their unique political and economic systems, as well as from a public health perspective—will claim success over those who experience a different, more devastating outcome.

一如既往，歷史將由危機的“勝利者”來書寫。每個國家，越來越多的個體，都以全新且強有力的方式經歷著這種疾病的社會壓力。不可避免地，相較之那些經歷了不同且更具破壞性的結果的國家，那些憑借其獨特的政治和經濟制度以及從公共衛生的角度出發而堅持不懈抗擊疫情的國家，將宣布取得更大的成功。

Either way, this crisis will reshuffle the international power structure in ways we can only begin to imagine. COVID-19 will continue to depress economic activity and increase tension between countries. Over the long term, the pandemic will likely significantly reduce the productive capacity of the global economy, especially if businesses close and individuals detach from the labor force. This risk of dislocation is especially great for developing nations and others with a large share of economically vulnerable workers. The international system will, in turn, come under great pressure, resulting in instability and widespread conflict within and across countries.

無論是哪種方式，這場危機都將以難以預料的方式對國際權力結構進行重新洗牌。此次危機將繼續抑制經濟活動并加劇國家間的緊張關系。從長遠來看，這種流行病很可能會大大降低全球經濟的生產能力，尤其是在企業關閉和個人脫離勞動力的情況下。這種錯位的風險對發展中國家和其他經濟脆弱且工人比例較大的國家尤其巨大。在這一力量的作用下，國際體系將承受巨大壓力，從而導致國家內部和國家之間出現不穩定和廣泛沖突。

9

A Dramatic New Stage in Global Capitalism

全球資本主義的嶄新舞臺

Laurie Garrett，前美國對外關系委員會全球衛生高級研究員，曾獲普利策獎的科學作家

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laurie_Garrett

The fundamental shock to the world’s financial and economic system is the recognition that global supply chains and distribution networks are deeply vulnerable to disruption. The coronavirus pandemic will therefore not only have long-lasting economic effects, but lead to a more fundamental change.

這次疫情對世界金融和經濟體系的根本沖擊在于，人們認識到全球供應鏈和分銷網絡極易受到破壞。因此，疫情大流行不僅將產生長期的經濟影響，而且將帶來更根本的變化。

Globalization allowed companies to farm out manufacturing all over the world and deliver their products to markets on a just-in-time basis, bypassing the costs of warehousing. Inventories that sat on shelves for more than a few days were considered market failures. Supply had to be sourced and shipped on a carefully orchestrated, global level. COVID-19 has proven that pathogens can not only infect people but poison the entire just-in-time system.

全球化使公司可以在全球范圍內進行生產，并將產品及時交付市場，從而避免了倉儲成本。擱置超過幾天的庫存被視作是市場失敗。供應必須在精心策劃的全球范圍內進行采購和運輸。COVID-19已證明，病原體不僅可以感染人，而且會毒害整個即時系統。

Given the scale of financial market losses the world has experienced since February, companies are likely to come out of this pandemic decidedly gun-shy about the just-in-time model and about globally dispersed production. The result could be a dramatic new stage in global capitalism, in which supply chains are brought closer to home and filled with redundancies to protect against future disruption. That may cut into companies’ near-term profits but render the entire system more resilient.

鑒于自2月以來世界經歷的金融市場損失規模之大，商業公司很可能試圖從這種大流行中擺脫出來，對即時模型和分布于全球的生產模式持保守態度。結果可能是全球資本主義出現了一個戲劇性的新階段，在這一階段中供應鏈離本土更近，并儲備冗余以防止未來的破壞。這可能會削減公司的短期利潤，但會使整個系統更具彈性。

10

More Failed States

更多失敗國家

Richard N. Haass，自2003年起擔任美國對外關系委員會主席，曾擔任美國國務院政策規劃主任，前國務卿克林·鮑威爾的資深幕僚

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yY_q5iPSsh0

Permanent is not a word I am fond of, as little or nothing is, but I would think the coronavirus crisis will at least for a few years lead most governments to turn inward, focusing on what takes place within their borders rather than on what happens beyond them. I anticipate greater moves toward selective self-sufficiency (and, as a result, decoupling) given supply chain vulnerability; even greater opposition to large-scale immigration; and a reduced willingness or commitment to tackle regional or global problems (including climate change) given the perceived need to dedicate resources to rebuild at home and deal with economic consequences of the crisis.

永久不是我（Haass本人）喜歡的詞，可以說是很少或根本不喜歡。但是冠狀病毒危機至少會在幾年內導致大多數政府對內轉向，即專注于其國土邊界內，而非外部世界所發生的事情。鑒于供應鏈的脆弱性，這些國家預期將出現這些趨勢：經濟上朝著選擇性的自給自足（以及隨之而來的脫鉤）邁出更大的步伐；對大規模移民的更大反對；鑒于人們認為需要將資源專用于家庭重建和應對危機的經濟后果，解決區域或全球問題（包括氣候變化）的意愿或承諾進一步降低。

I would expect many countries will have difficulty recovering from the crisis, with state weakness and failed states becoming an even more prevalent feature of the world. The crisis will likely contribute to the ongoing deterioration of Sino-American relations and the weakening of European integration. On the positive side, we should see some modest strengthening of global public health governance. But overall, a crisis rooted in globalization will weaken rather than add to the world’s willingness and ability to deal with it.

預計有許多國家將難以從危機中恢復，而國家的軟弱和失敗的國家將成為世界上更加普遍的特征。這場危機可能會加劇中美關系的持續惡化和歐洲一體化的減弱。從積極的一面看，我們應該看到全球公共衛生治理有所加強。但是總的來說，植根于全球化的危機將削弱而不是增加世界的應對意愿和能力。

11

The United States Has Failed the Leadership Test

美國未能通過領導力測試

Kori Schake, 國際戰略研究所副所長；在美國國防部和國務院以及國家安全委員會擔任多個高級職務；曾擔任2008年麥凱恩-佩林總統大選的外交政策顧問

https://www.theapricity.com/forum/showthread.php?265047-Classify-German-Dr-Kori-Schake

The United States will no longer be seen as an international leader because of its government’s narrow self-interest and bungling incompetence. The global effects of this pandemic could have been greatly attenuated by having international organizations provide more and earlier information, which would have given governments time to prepare and direct resources to where they’re most needed. This is something the United States could have organized, showing that while it is self-interested, it is not solely self-interested. Washington has failed the leadership test, and the world is worse off for it.

由于美國政府狹隘的自私自利和無所作為，美國將不再被視作國際領導。通過讓國際組織提供更多和更早的信息，可以大大減輕這種流行病的全球影響，這將使政府有時間準備并將資源定向到最需要的地方。這是美國本可以組織的事情，盡管這也是基于自身利益的考慮，但不僅僅是一種自利行為。華盛頓未能通過領導力測試，因此世界變得更加糟糕。

12

In Every Country, We See the Power of the Human Spirit

在每個國家，我們都看到了人性的力量

Nicholas Burns，哈佛大學約翰肯尼迪政府學院外交與國際政治實踐教授；美國前外交官

https://europe.columbia.edu/news/ei-lecture-ambassador-r-nicholas-burns

The COVID-19 pandemic is the greatest global crisis of this century. Its depth and scale are enormous. The public health crisis threatens each of the 7.8 billion people on Earth. The financial and economic crisis could exceed in its impact the Great Recession of 2008-2009. Each crisis alone could provide a seismic shock that permanently changes the international system and balance of power as we know it.

這次疫情大流行是本世紀以來最大的全球危機。它的深度和規模是巨大的。公共衛生危機威脅著地球上78億人口中的每一個。金融和經濟危機的影響可能超過2008-2009年的大衰退。眾所周知，每場危機都會給世界帶來震動，這將永久改變國際體系和力量平衡。

To date, international collaboration has been woefully insufficient. If the United States and China, the world’s most powerful countries, cannot put aside their war of words over which of them is responsible for the crisis and lead more effectively, both countries’ credibility may be significantly diminished. If the European Union cannot provide more targeted assistance to its 500 million citizens, national governments might take back more power from Brussels in the future. In the United States, what is most at stake is the ability of the federal government to provide effective measures to stem the crisis.

迄今為止，國際合作嚴重不足。如果美國和中國這兩個世界上最強大的國家不能擱置關于誰應該對這場危機負責和更有效領導的問題的口水戰，那么兩國的信譽可能會大大降低。如果歐盟不能為其5億公民提供更有針對性的援助，將來各國政府可能會從布魯塞爾收回更多權力。在美國，聯邦政府提供有效措施來遏制危機的能力正經受考驗。

In every country, however, there are many examples of the power of the human spirit—of doctors, nurses, political leaders, and ordinary citizens demonstrating resilience, effectiveness, and leadership. That provides hope that men and women around the world can prevail in response to this extraordinary challenge.

但是，在每個國家/地區，都有許多體現人性力量的例子-醫生、護士、政治領導人和普通公民都表現出了韌性、效力和領導能力。這為人們提供了希望，相信世界各地的男性和女性可以共同應對這一非凡挑戰。

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（Cambridge China Centre）

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