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12位頂尖國際事務(wù)專家預(yù)測：新冠大流行之后，世界將走向何方？
CambCC CambCC
文章來源：
《外交政策》（Foreign Policy）雜志
中文翻譯：
Jennie Yu（Wechat Official Account: itsjennieyu）
導(dǎo)語
3月20日，《外交政策》(Foreign Policy)雜志組織了12位頂尖的國際事務(wù)專家討論新冠疫情對世界的影響，發(fā)表題為《新冠大流行之后，世界將走向何方？》一文。
12位國際事務(wù)專家涵蓋政治、軍事、經(jīng)濟(jì)、國際組織、公共衛(wèi)生等領(lǐng)域，“全明星陣容”令人矚目。以下為12位專家的觀點(diǎn)摘要。
1
A World Less Open, Prosperous, and Free
一個更不開放、不繁榮、不自由的世界
Stephen M. Walt，哈佛大學(xué)肯尼迪政府學(xué)院國際事務(wù)教授，國際關(guān)系的現(xiàn)實(shí)主義學(xué)派
The pandemic will strengthen the state and reinforce nationalism. COVID-19 will also accelerate the shift in power and influence from West to East. South Korea and Singapore have responded best, and China has reacted well after its early mistakes. The response in Europe and America has been slow and haphazard by comparison, further tarnishing the aura of the Western “brand.”
大流行將加強(qiáng)國家力量和民族主義，也將加速權(quán)力和影響力從西方轉(zhuǎn)移到東方。韓國和新加坡的反應(yīng)最好，而中國在經(jīng)歷了早期的錯誤之后反應(yīng)良好。相比之下，歐美的反應(yīng)緩慢而隨意，進(jìn)一步損害了西方“品牌”的光環(huán)。
What won’t change is the fundamentally conflictive nature of world politics. Previous plagues—including the influenza epidemic of 1918-1919—did not end great-power rivalry nor usher in a new era of global cooperation. Neither will COVID-19. We will see a further retreat from hyperglobalization, as citizens look to national governments to protect them and as states and firms seek to reduce future vulnerabilities.
不會改變的是世界政治的沖突本質(zhì)。先前的瘟疫(包括1918-1919年的流感大流行)并未結(jié)束大國之間的競爭，也未迎來全球合作的新時代。這次也不會。隨著公民們尋求國家政府的保護(hù)，以及各州和企業(yè)尋求減少未來的脆弱性，我們將看到“超全球化”的進(jìn)一步退縮。
2
The End of Globalization as We Know It
為我們所知的全球化的終結(jié)
Robin Niblett，英國國際關(guān)系專家
The coronavirus pandemic could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back of economic globalization. China’s growing economic and military power had already provoked a bipartisan determination in the United States to decouple China from U.S.-sourced high technology and intellectual property and try to force allies to follow suit. Increasing public and political pressure to meet carbon emissions reduction targets had already called into question many companies’ reliance on long-distance supply chains. Now, COVID-19 is forcing governments, companies, and societies to strengthen their capacity to cope with extended periods of economic self-isolation.
COVID-19大流行對于經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化而言可能是壓倒駱駝的最后一根稻草。中國日益增長的經(jīng)濟(jì)和軍事實(shí)力已經(jīng)使得美國兩黨形成一致判斷，即要使中國與美國的高科技和知識產(chǎn)權(quán)脫鉤，并試圖迫使其盟友效仿。此外，實(shí)現(xiàn)碳減排目標(biāo)的公共和政治壓力日益增強(qiáng)。這迫使政府、公司和社會加強(qiáng)其應(yīng)對長期的經(jīng)濟(jì)自我孤立的能力。
It seems highly unlikely in this context that the world will return to the idea of mutually beneficial globalization that defined the early 21st century. And without the incentive to protect the shared gains from global economic integration, the architecture of global economic governance established in the 20th century will quickly atrophy. It will then take enormous self-discipline for political leaders to sustain international cooperation and not retreat into overt geopolitical competition.
在這種情況下，世界似乎極不可能回到定義了21世紀(jì)初的互利全球化的概念狀態(tài)。如果沒有動力保護(hù)共享利益不受全球經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化的影響，那么20世紀(jì)建立的全球經(jīng)濟(jì)治理架構(gòu)將迅速萎縮。如此一來，政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人將需要極大的自律才能維持國際合作，而非退縮到公開的地緣政治競爭中。
Proving to their citizens that they can manage the COVID-19 crisis will buy leaders some political capital. But those who fail will find it hard to resist the temptation to blame others for their failure.
向公民證明他們可以應(yīng)對疫情危機(jī)，將為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人帶來一些政治資本。但是那些失敗的人會發(fā)現(xiàn)很難抗拒將失敗歸咎于他人的誘惑。
3
A More China-Centric Globalization
一個更以中國為中心的全球化
Kishore Mahbubani，新加坡國立大學(xué)亞洲研究所研究員，前新加坡駐聯(lián)合國大使
The COVID-19 pandemic will not fundamentally alter global economic directions. It will only accelerate a change that had already begun: a move away from U.S.-centric globalization to a more China-centric globalization.
COVID-19大流行不會從根本上改變?nèi)蚪?jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展方向。它只會加速已經(jīng)開始的變革，即從以美國為中心的全球化向更加以中國為中心的全球化轉(zhuǎn)變。
Why will this trend continue? The American population has lost faith in globalization and international trade. Free trade agreements are toxic, with or without U.S. President Donald Trump. By contrast, China has not lost faith. Why not? There are deeper historical reasons. Chinese leaders now know well that China’s century of humiliation from 1842 to 1949 was a result of its own complacency and a futile effort by its leaders to cut it off from the world. By contrast, the past few decades of economic resurgence were a result of global engagement.
為什么這種趨勢會繼續(xù)下去？因?yàn)槊绹藢θ蚧蛧H貿(mào)易失去了信心。無論有沒有特朗普，自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定都是有毒的。相比之下，中國并沒有失去信心。為什么不？有更深的歷史原因。中國現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)知道，從1842年到1949年，中國遭受屈辱的一個世紀(jì)是其自身的自滿情緒以及當(dāng)時努力將自身與世隔絕的結(jié)果。相比之下，過去幾十年的經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇是全球參與的結(jié)果。
Consequently, as I document in my new book, Has China Won?, the United States has two choices. If its primary goal is to maintain global primacy, it will have to engage in a zero-sum geopolitical contest, politically and economically, with China. However, if the goal of the United States is to improve the well-being of the American people—whose social condition has deteriorated—it should cooperate with China. Wiser counsel would suggest that cooperation would be the better choice. However, given the toxic U.S. political environment toward China, wiser counsel may not prevail.
因此，正如新書《中國贏了嗎？》所述，美國有兩種選擇。如果其主要目標(biāo)是維持全球主導(dǎo)地位，它將必須與中國在政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)上進(jìn)行零和的地緣政治競賽。但是，如果美國的目標(biāo)是改善其社會狀況日益惡化的人民的福祉，那么它應(yīng)該與中國合作。明智的政策顧問會建議，合作將是更好的選擇。但是，鑒于美國對華政治環(huán)境惡劣，這些明智的政策顧問們可能不會占上風(fēng)。
4
Democracies Will Come out of Their Shell
民主國家將擺脫困境
G. John Ikenberry，國際關(guān)系和美國外交政策專家，普林斯頓大學(xué)政治與國際事務(wù)教授
In the short term, the crisis will give fuel to all the various camps in the Western grand strategy debate. Given the economic damage and social collapse that is unfolding, it is hard to see anything other than a reinforcement of the movement toward nationalism, great-power rivalry, strategic decoupling, and the like.
在短期內(nèi)，這場危機(jī)將為西方大戰(zhàn)略辯論中的所有陣營提供動力。鑒于正在遭受的經(jīng)濟(jì)破壞和社會崩潰，除了加強(qiáng)民族主義、大國競爭、戰(zhàn)略脫鉤等行動外，幾乎看不到其他任何東西。
But just like in the 1930s and ’40s, there might also be a slower-evolving countercurrent, a sort of hardheaded internationalism similar to the one that Franklin D. Roosevelt and a few other statesmen began to articulate before and during the war. The 1930s collapse of the world economy showed how connected modern societies were and how vulnerable they were to what FDR called contagion. The United States was less threatened by other great powers than by the deep forces—and Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde character—of modernity. What FDR and other internationalists conjured was a postwar order that would rebuild an open system with new forms of protection and capacities to manage interdependence. The United States couldn’t simply hide within its borders, but to operate in an open postwar order required the building of a global infrastructure of multilateral cooperation.
但是，就像1930年代和40年代一樣，逆潮流的發(fā)展可能也較慢，這是一種頑固的國際主義，類似于富蘭克林·羅斯福和其他一些政治家在戰(zhàn)前和戰(zhàn)時闡述的那種國際主義。1930年代世界經(jīng)濟(jì)的崩潰表明現(xiàn)代社會之間是如何聯(lián)系的，以及它們在羅斯福所稱的傳染病面前是如此脆弱。美國受到其他大國的威脅要少于受到如“變身怪醫(yī)”般的現(xiàn)代性的強(qiáng)大力量威脅。羅斯福和其他國際主義者想到的是戰(zhàn)后世界秩序，它將重建一個具有新形式的保護(hù)和管理相互依存能力的開放體系。美國不能僅僅躲藏在其邊界內(nèi)，而要按照戰(zhàn)后的開放秩序開展行動，這就需要建立全球性的多邊合作基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施機(jī)制。
So the United States and other Western democracies might travel through this same sequence of reactions driven by a cascading sense of vulnerability; the response might be more nationalist at first, but over the longer term, the democracies will come out of their shells to find a new type of pragmatic and protective internationalism.
因此，美國和其他西方國家可能會經(jīng)歷同樣的一系列反應(yīng)，這種反應(yīng)是由噴薄而出的脆弱性所驅(qū)動的。其回應(yīng)最初可能是民族主義，但從長遠(yuǎn)來看，西方國家會擺脫困境，找到一種新型的實(shí)用主義和保護(hù)性國際主義。
5
Lower Profits, but More Stability
收益更低、但更穩(wěn)定
Shannon K. O’Neil, 美國外交關(guān)系協(xié)會拉丁美洲研究高級研究員
COVID-19 is undermining the basic tenets of global manufacturing. Companies will now rethink and shrink the multistep, multicountry supply chains that dominate production today.
COVID-19正在破壞全球制造業(yè)的基本原則。一些公司將重新考慮并縮小如今主導(dǎo)生產(chǎn)的多步驟、多國家供應(yīng)鏈。
Global supply chains were already coming under fire—economically, due to rising Chinese labor costs, U.S. President Donald Trump’s trade war, and advances in robotics, automation, and 3D printing, as well as politically, due to real and perceived job losses, especially in mature economies. COVID-19 has now broken many of these links: Factory closings in afflicted areas have left other manufacturers—as well as hospitals, pharmacies, supermarkets, and retail stores—bereft of inventories and products.
全球供應(yīng)鏈已在經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治上受到?jīng)_擊。在經(jīng)濟(jì)上，這是由于中國勞動力成本上漲，特朗普的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)，以及機(jī)器人技術(shù)、自動化和3D打印技術(shù)的進(jìn)步。在政治上，這是由于實(shí)際和可感知的失業(yè)增長，特別是在成熟經(jīng)濟(jì)體中。疫情已在不同方面打破了全球供應(yīng)鏈的紐帶，例如受災(zāi)地區(qū)的工廠關(guān)閉使其他制造商以及醫(yī)院、藥房、超級市場和零售商店的庫存和產(chǎn)品流失。
On the other side of the pandemic, more companies will demand to know more about where their supplies come from and will trade off efficiency for redundancy. Governments will intervene as well, forcing what they consider strategic industries to have domestic backup plans and reserves. Profitability will fall, but supply stability should rise.
在大流行的另一面，更多公司將要求更了解其供應(yīng)來源，并以效率為代價予以折衷。各國政府也將進(jìn)行干預(yù)，迫使那些被其視作“戰(zhàn)略性”的行業(yè)制定國內(nèi)后備計(jì)劃和儲備。盈利能力將下降，但供應(yīng)穩(wěn)定性會提高。
6
This Pandemic Can Serve a Useful Purpose
這次大流行能夠發(fā)揮有益作用
Shivshankar Menon，美國布魯金斯學(xué)會印度中心研究員，曾任印度總理曼莫漢·辛格的國家安全顧問
It is early days yet, but three things seem apparent. First, the coronavirus pandemic will change our politics, both within states and between them. It is to the power of government that societies—even libertarians—have turned. Government’s relative success in overcoming the pandemic and its economic effects will exacerbate or diminish security issues and the recent polarization within societies. Either way, government is back.
疫情目前還處于初期，但有三件事已趨于明朗。首先，大流行將改變我們的國家內(nèi)政治與國家間政治。政府在克服大流行及其經(jīng)濟(jì)影響方面的相對成功將加劇或減少安全問題以及近期社會內(nèi)部的兩極分化。無論是哪種方式，政府力量都重回人們視線。
Secondly, this is not yet the end of an interconnected world. The pandemic itself is proof of our interdependence. But in all polities, there is already a turning inward, a search for autonomy and control of one’s own fate. We are headed for a poorer, meaner, and smaller world.
其次，這不是互聯(lián)世界的終結(jié)。大流行本身就是我們相互依存的證明。但是在所有政治體中，已經(jīng)有了內(nèi)化，尋求自主權(quán)和對自身命運(yùn)控制權(quán)的出現(xiàn)。我們將走向一個更貧窮，更卑鄙和更小的世界。
Finally, there are signs of hope and good sense. India took the initiative to convene a video conference of all South Asian leaders to craft a common regional response to the threat. If the pandemic shocks us into recognizing our real interest in cooperating multilaterally on the big global issues facing us, it will have served a useful purpose.
最后，也存在著希望和善意的態(tài)度。印度主動召開了一次所有南亞領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人參與的電視會議，以期就該威脅達(dá)成共同的區(qū)域應(yīng)對措施。如果這種流行病使我們認(rèn)識到我們真正感興趣的是在我們面臨的全球性大問題上進(jìn)行多邊合作，那么它將起到有益的作用。
7
American Power Will Need a New Strategy
美國權(quán)力需要一種新戰(zhàn)略
Joseph S. Nye, Jr.，“軟實(shí)力”之父，曾任哈佛大學(xué)肯尼迪政府學(xué)院院長，卡特政府的副國務(wù)卿幫辦、克林頓政府的助理國防部長及國家情報委員會主席
In 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump announced a new national security strategy that focuses on great-power competition. COVID-19 shows this strategy to be inadequate. Even if the United States prevails as a great power, it cannot protect its security by acting alone.
2017年，美國總統(tǒng)唐納德·特朗普宣布了一項(xiàng)側(cè)重于大國競爭的新國家安全戰(zhàn)略。COVID-19的爆發(fā)則顯示出這一戰(zhàn)略的不充分性。即使美國以大國之姿主宰（世界），也不能通過單獨(dú)行動來保護(hù)自身安全。
On transnational threats like COVID-19 and climate change, it is not enough to think of American power over other nations. The key to success is also learning the importance of power with others. Every country puts its national interest first; the important question is how broadly or narrowly this interest is defined. COVID-19 shows we are failing to adjust our strategy to this new world.
對于像COVID-19和氣候變化這樣的跨國威脅，僅僅考慮美國相對于其他國家的力量是不夠的。成功的關(guān)鍵還在于與他者共同認(rèn)識到權(quán)力的重要性。每個國家都將國家利益放在首位，但重要的問題是對這種利益的界定是廣義的還是狹義的。目前表明，美國未能制定與新世界相適應(yīng)的國家戰(zhàn)略。
8
The History of COVID-19 Will Be Written by the Victors
歷史將由勝利者書寫
John Allen，國布魯金斯學(xué)會現(xiàn)任主席，曾任美國海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)四星將軍，北約國際安全援助部隊(duì)和駐阿富汗美軍的前司令官
As it has always been, history will be written by the “victors” of the COVID-19 crisis. Every nation, and increasingly every individual, is experiencing the societal strain of this disease in new and powerful ways. Inevitably, those nations that persevere—both by virtue of their unique political and economic systems, as well as from a public health perspective—will claim success over those who experience a different, more devastating outcome.
一如既往，歷史將由危機(jī)的“勝利者”來書寫。每個國家，越來越多的個體，都以全新且強(qiáng)有力的方式經(jīng)歷著這種疾病的社會壓力。不可避免地，相較之那些經(jīng)歷了不同且更具破壞性的結(jié)果的國家，那些憑借其獨(dú)特的政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)制度以及從公共衛(wèi)生的角度出發(fā)而堅(jiān)持不懈抗擊疫情的國家，將宣布取得更大的成功。
Either way, this crisis will reshuffle the international power structure in ways we can only begin to imagine. COVID-19 will continue to depress economic activity and increase tension between countries. Over the long term, the pandemic will likely significantly reduce the productive capacity of the global economy, especially if businesses close and individuals detach from the labor force. This risk of dislocation is especially great for developing nations and others with a large share of economically vulnerable workers. The international system will, in turn, come under great pressure, resulting in instability and widespread conflict within and across countries.
無論是哪種方式，這場危機(jī)都將以難以預(yù)料的方式對國際權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)進(jìn)行重新洗牌。此次危機(jī)將繼續(xù)抑制經(jīng)濟(jì)活動并加劇國家間的緊張關(guān)系。從長遠(yuǎn)來看，這種流行病很可能會大大降低全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的生產(chǎn)能力，尤其是在企業(yè)關(guān)閉和個人脫離勞動力的情況下。這種錯位的風(fēng)險對發(fā)展中國家和其他經(jīng)濟(jì)脆弱且工人比例較大的國家尤其巨大。在這一力量的作用下，國際體系將承受巨大壓力，從而導(dǎo)致國家內(nèi)部和國家之間出現(xiàn)不穩(wěn)定和廣泛沖突。
9
A Dramatic New Stage in Global Capitalism
全球資本主義的嶄新舞臺
Laurie Garrett，前美國對外關(guān)系委員會全球衛(wèi)生高級研究員，曾獲普利策獎的科學(xué)作家
The fundamental shock to the world’s financial and economic system is the recognition that global supply chains and distribution networks are deeply vulnerable to disruption. The coronavirus pandemic will therefore not only have long-lasting economic effects, but lead to a more fundamental change.
這次疫情對世界金融和經(jīng)濟(jì)體系的根本沖擊在于，人們認(rèn)識到全球供應(yīng)鏈和分銷網(wǎng)絡(luò)極易受到破壞。因此，疫情大流行不僅將產(chǎn)生長期的經(jīng)濟(jì)影響，而且將帶來更根本的變化。
Globalization allowed companies to farm out manufacturing all over the world and deliver their products to markets on a just-in-time basis, bypassing the costs of warehousing. Inventories that sat on shelves for more than a few days were considered market failures. Supply had to be sourced and shipped on a carefully orchestrated, global level. COVID-19 has proven that pathogens can not only infect people but poison the entire just-in-time system.
全球化使公司可以在全球范圍內(nèi)進(jìn)行生產(chǎn)，并將產(chǎn)品及時交付市場，從而避免了倉儲成本。擱置超過幾天的庫存被視作是市場失敗。供應(yīng)必須在精心策劃的全球范圍內(nèi)進(jìn)行采購和運(yùn)輸。COVID-19已證明，病原體不僅可以感染人，而且會毒害整個即時系統(tǒng)。
Given the scale of financial market losses the world has experienced since February, companies are likely to come out of this pandemic decidedly gun-shy about the just-in-time model and about globally dispersed production. The result could be a dramatic new stage in global capitalism, in which supply chains are brought closer to home and filled with redundancies to protect against future disruption. That may cut into companies’ near-term profits but render the entire system more resilient.
鑒于自2月以來世界經(jīng)歷的金融市場損失規(guī)模之大，商業(yè)公司很可能試圖從這種大流行中擺脫出來，對即時模型和分布于全球的生產(chǎn)模式持保守態(tài)度。結(jié)果可能是全球資本主義出現(xiàn)了一個戲劇性的新階段，在這一階段中供應(yīng)鏈離本土更近，并儲備冗余以防止未來的破壞。這可能會削減公司的短期利潤，但會使整個系統(tǒng)更具彈性。
10
More Failed States
更多失敗國家
Richard N. Haass，自2003年起擔(dān)任美國對外關(guān)系委員會主席，曾擔(dān)任美國國務(wù)院政策規(guī)劃主任，前國務(wù)卿克林·鮑威爾的資深幕僚
Permanent is not a word I am fond of, as little or nothing is, but I would think the coronavirus crisis will at least for a few years lead most governments to turn inward, focusing on what takes place within their borders rather than on what happens beyond them. I anticipate greater moves toward selective self-sufficiency (and, as a result, decoupling) given supply chain vulnerability; even greater opposition to large-scale immigration; and a reduced willingness or commitment to tackle regional or global problems (including climate change) given the perceived need to dedicate resources to rebuild at home and deal with economic consequences of the crisis.
永久不是我（Haass本人）喜歡的詞，可以說是很少或根本不喜歡。但是冠狀病毒危機(jī)至少會在幾年內(nèi)導(dǎo)致大多數(shù)政府對內(nèi)轉(zhuǎn)向，即專注于其國土邊界內(nèi)，而非外部世界所發(fā)生的事情。鑒于供應(yīng)鏈的脆弱性，這些國家預(yù)期將出現(xiàn)這些趨勢：經(jīng)濟(jì)上朝著選擇性的自給自足（以及隨之而來的脫鉤）邁出更大的步伐；對大規(guī)模移民的更大反對；鑒于人們認(rèn)為需要將資源專用于家庭重建和應(yīng)對危機(jī)的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果，解決區(qū)域或全球問題（包括氣候變化）的意愿或承諾進(jìn)一步降低。
I would expect many countries will have difficulty recovering from the crisis, with state weakness and failed states becoming an even more prevalent feature of the world. The crisis will likely contribute to the ongoing deterioration of Sino-American relations and the weakening of European integration. On the positive side, we should see some modest strengthening of global public health governance. But overall, a crisis rooted in globalization will weaken rather than add to the world’s willingness and ability to deal with it.
預(yù)計(jì)有許多國家將難以從危機(jī)中恢復(fù)，而國家的軟弱和失敗的國家將成為世界上更加普遍的特征。這場危機(jī)可能會加劇中美關(guān)系的持續(xù)惡化和歐洲一體化的減弱。從積極的一面看，我們應(yīng)該看到全球公共衛(wèi)生治理有所加強(qiáng)。但是總的來說，植根于全球化的危機(jī)將削弱而不是增加世界的應(yīng)對意愿和能力。
11
The United States Has Failed the Leadership Test
美國未能通過領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力測試
Kori Schake, 國際戰(zhàn)略研究所副所長；在美國國防部和國務(wù)院以及國家安全委員會擔(dān)任多個高級職務(wù)；曾擔(dān)任2008年麥凱恩-佩林總統(tǒng)大選的外交政策顧問
The United States will no longer be seen as an international leader because of its government’s narrow self-interest and bungling incompetence. The global effects of this pandemic could have been greatly attenuated by having international organizations provide more and earlier information, which would have given governments time to prepare and direct resources to where they’re most needed. This is something the United States could have organized, showing that while it is self-interested, it is not solely self-interested. Washington has failed the leadership test, and the world is worse off for it.
由于美國政府狹隘的自私自利和無所作為，美國將不再被視作國際領(lǐng)導(dǎo)。通過讓國際組織提供更多和更早的信息，可以大大減輕這種流行病的全球影響，這將使政府有時間準(zhǔn)備并將資源定向到最需要的地方。這是美國本可以組織的事情，盡管這也是基于自身利益的考慮，但不僅僅是一種自利行為。華盛頓未能通過領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力測試，因此世界變得更加糟糕。
12
In Every Country, We See the Power of the Human Spirit
在每個國家，我們都看到了人性的力量
Nicholas Burns，哈佛大學(xué)約翰肯尼迪政府學(xué)院外交與國際政治實(shí)踐教授；美國前外交官
The COVID-19 pandemic is the greatest global crisis of this century. Its depth and scale are enormous. The public health crisis threatens each of the 7.8 billion people on Earth. The financial and economic crisis could exceed in its impact the Great Recession of 2008-2009. Each crisis alone could provide a seismic shock that permanently changes the international system and balance of power as we know it.
這次疫情大流行是本世紀(jì)以來最大的全球危機(jī)。它的深度和規(guī)模是巨大的。公共衛(wèi)生危機(jī)威脅著地球上78億人口中的每一個。金融和經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)的影響可能超過2008-2009年的大衰退。眾所周知，每場危機(jī)都會給世界帶來震動，這將永久改變國際體系和力量平衡。
To date, international collaboration has been woefully insufficient. If the United States and China, the world’s most powerful countries, cannot put aside their war of words over which of them is responsible for the crisis and lead more effectively, both countries’ credibility may be significantly diminished. If the European Union cannot provide more targeted assistance to its 500 million citizens, national governments might take back more power from Brussels in the future. In the United States, what is most at stake is the ability of the federal government to provide effective measures to stem the crisis.
迄今為止，國際合作嚴(yán)重不足。如果美國和中國這兩個世界上最強(qiáng)大的國家不能擱置關(guān)于誰應(yīng)該對這場危機(jī)負(fù)責(zé)和更有效領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的問題的口水戰(zhàn)，那么兩國的信譽(yù)可能會大大降低。如果歐盟不能為其5億公民提供更有針對性的援助，將來各國政府可能會從布魯塞爾收回更多權(quán)力。在美國，聯(lián)邦政府提供有效措施來遏制危機(jī)的能力正經(jīng)受考驗(yàn)。
In every country, however, there are many examples of the power of the human spirit—of doctors, nurses, political leaders, and ordinary citizens demonstrating resilience, effectiveness, and leadership. That provides hope that men and women around the world can prevail in response to this extraordinary challenge.
但是，在每個國家/地區(qū)，都有許多體現(xiàn)人性力量的例子-醫(yī)生、護(hù)士、政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人和普通公民都表現(xiàn)出了韌性、效力和領(lǐng)導(dǎo)能力。這為人們提供了希望，相信世界各地的男性和女性可以共同應(yīng)對這一非凡挑戰(zhàn)。
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（Cambridge China Centre）
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